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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BETTY P. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No.
13981

vs •
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver's
License Division, Department of
Public Safety, State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case concerns the legality and reasonableness
of the revocation of the driving license of Respondent
by Appellant under the Utah Implied Consent Lav;, Section
41-6-44,10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Respondent will agree with the correctness of the
statement found in the Brief of Appellant on the disposition
of this case in the court below.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks the affirmation of the order of
the lower court made on the 14th day of January, 19 75, which
rescinded the revocation of the driving license of Respondent
and restored the driving privileges of Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 6th day of April, 1974, Trooper Clint Hendry
of the Utah State Highway Patrol observed a vehicle, subsequently
determined to have been driven by Respondent, proceeding southbound on a two-lane highway in the vicinity of 3500 South
Redwood Road at approximately 2:20 or 2:30 a.m.

(Findings of

Fact 1; Trial Transcript 2-3). Noticing the weaving and slow
speed of the vehicle, the trooper stopped the car.
Fact 3,4; T. 3, lines 3-14).

(Findings of

Trooper Hendry smelled alcohol

on or near Respondent's person, whereupon he administered
field tests and feeling them unsatisfactory, placed Respondent
under arrest for Driving While Under the Influence at approximately 2:40 a.m,

(Findings of Fact 5; T. 4-6).

Respondent was

advised by Trooper Hendry of her Miranda Rights together with
the Utah Implied Consent Law, and Respondent indicated that she
understood (Findings of Fact 6; T. 6) .

Respondent indicated

to the trooper that she would submit to a chemical test but
that she wished to consult with a lawyer prior to such test being
conducted (Findings of Fact 7? T. 6, lines 21-26; T. 14, lines
14-22).
Trooper Hendry and Respondent arrived at the jail at
approximately 3:10 a.m. (T. 7, line 6 ) . After some preliminary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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her attorney, Richard Maughan, at approximately 3:30 a.m.
(Findings of Fact 8; T. 7, lines 8-17).

After Respondent

conversed with her lawyer, she advised Trooper Hendry that she
would submit to a chemical test of either her breath or blood,
but did not desire to do so until her attorney arrived at the
jail (Findings of Fact 9; T. 8, lines 27-28; T. 25, lines 4-7).
Trooper Hendry, after speaking to Mr. Maughan on the phone,
agreed to delaying the test until Mr. Maughan arrived at the
jail (Brief of Appellant).

The trooper was aware that Mr.

Maughan did not live in Salt Lake City, but resided in Bountiful,
Utah.

(T. 18, lines 23-24)..
At approximately 4:15 a.m., Respondent was advised

by Trooper Hendry that she should again check with her attorney
since he had not arrived at the jail.

Respondent called the

home of Richard Maughan and was informed that Mr. Maughan was
on his way to the jail and advised Trooper Hendry that her
lawyer was en route to the jail (Findings of Fact 10; T. 10,
lines 3-11; T. 25, lines 23-30; T. 26, lines 1-6).

Trooper

Hendry waited an additional five to ten minutes and thereupon
told Respondent he could wait no longer and advised Respondent
concerning her rights regarding the chemical test of her breath
or blood.

Respondent advised Trooper Hendry she would submit

to a test on the arrival of her lawyer (Findings of Fact 11;
T. 10, lines 13-18; T. 26, lines 9-12).

It was at this time,

apparently, that Trooper Hendry first informed Respondent that
unless she submitted to a chemical test he would file a refusal
form (T. 10, lines 13-23).
Trooper Hendry, immediately after the above discourse
took place, left the jail and went to the packing lot of the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice where he waited approximately
fifteen minutes while completing his reports.

The trooper

informed no one that he would be waiting in the parking lot
(Findings of Fact 12; T. 10, lines 24-26; T. 12, lines 15-18).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Maughan arrived at the jail to advise Respondent (Findings
of Fact 13; T. 26, lines 9-12).

Mr. Maughan told Respondent

that he had been waiting ten minutes to see her (T. 26, lines
14-15).

Respondent was released on her own recognizance without

having taken a chemical test approximately fifteen to twenty
minutes later (T. 27, lines 19-20).
Appellant in his statement of Facts contained in
his Brief correctly states the conclusions of law of the trial
court.
ARGUMENT
Contrary to the assertion of Appellant in Point Two
of his Brief, Respondent does not argue nor did the trial court
conclude that under the ruling of Hunter v. Dorius, 2 3 Utah
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969), the right of a defendant to
consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test for
alcohol content necessarily includes the right to have counsel
physically present at the time of the administration of the
test.
However, it should be noted that the issue of the right
to have counsel physically present prior to submitting or during
the administration of a chemical test under an Implied Consent
Statute is far from resolved.

In Schmerber v. California,

384 US 757 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that
where a defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence,
a blood sample could be involuntarily withdrawn without violating
defendant's right to due process or privilege against selfincrimination.

More specifically, the Court rejected a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel argument.

The defendant had actually

consulted with counsel who advised the defendant to refuse to
submit to any chemical tests.

The defendant claimed that

compelling the test in light of a refusal based on advise of
counsel denied the former's right to the assistance of an
attorney. Digitized
The by
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No issue of counsel's ability to assist
petitioner in respect of any rights he did
possess is presented. The limited claim thus
made must be rejected. 384 US 757, at 766.
As noted subsequently in United States v. Wade, 388
US 218 (1967), the denial of the right to counsel claim in
Schmerber v. California/ supra, was based on the attorney's
inability to assist the defendant, under those facts, to any
greater degree in respect to the defendant's rights than the
attorney had already done by advising a refusal of the test.
At least two state courts have recognized that the
physical presence of the attorney prior to or during the
administration of a chemical test is necessary to fully protect
the rights of the defendant.

In State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547,

178 S.E. 2d 462 (1971), the defendant, arrested for Driving
Under the Influence, claimed that he requested an attorney but
was not allowed to call one until after the chemical test was
administered.

Even after defendant's attorney arrived at the

jail, he was not allowed to see his client.

The North Caro-

lina Supreme Court held the right to have witnesses included
the right to communicate with friends or a lawyer immediately
after arrest for drunk driving.
When one is taken into police custody
for an offense of which intoxication is an
essential element, time is of the essence.
Intoxication does not last.
...if one accused of driving while
intoxicated is to have witnesses for his
defense, he must have access to his counsel,
friends, relatives, or some disinterested
person within a relatively short time after
his arrest.
...the right of a defendant to communicate with counsel and friends implies, at
the very least, the right to have them see
him, observe and examine him, with reference
to his alleged intoxication. 178 S.E. 2d 462,
at 466.
Similarly, in Narten v. Curry, 33 Ohio Misc, 94, 291
N.E. 2d 799 (1972), the Ohio Court concluded that the criminal
aspects of a charge of Driving Under the Influence could not
Digitized by
the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Reuben Clark Law School,of
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to take a chemical test under an Implied Consent Statute.
Applying Argersinger v. Hamlen, 497 US 25, the court held that
whenever a delay in taking a chemical test was due to the
defendant attempting to reach counsel, that the delay could
not constitute a refusal if the defendant subsequently agreed
to submit to the test.
POINT I
Under the ruling of Hunter v. Dorius,
supra, Utah Law recognizes a right to consult
with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical
test under the Utah Implied Consent Statute.
Under the decision of this Court in Hunter v. Dorius,
supra, Utah Law recognizes the right of an accused charged with
Driving Under the Influence to consult with an attorney prior
to submitting to a chemical test under the Implied Consent
Law, Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The accused in Hunter v. Dorius, supra, was involved
in a car accident at 8:00 p.m.
around 8:30.

The police arrived at the scene

Accused was arrested and transported to the jail,

arriving at 9:15 p.m.

Accused v/as asked to take a chemical test

but allowed to call an attorney.

At one point, the accused did

reach an associate of his attorney who advised him not to take
any tests.

At 9:48 p.m., the accused was advised of the

consequence of any further refusal to take a chemical test as
under Section 41-6-4 4.10, supra.

When the accused still did

not submit to a test, the officer filled out a refusal form
completing it at 10:05 p.m.

Shortly after the accused's final

refusal to take the test until he spoke to his own attorney,
and not merely his associate, his attorney did reach him at
the jail and advised him to take the test.
refused to administer it.

However, the officer

This Court held,

After the plaintiff (the accused) had been
advised as to his rights under the statute and
the consequences of his refusal to submit to a test
at the hour of 9:48 p.m., the plaintiff still
had a reasonable time in which to make up his
mind and seek legal counsel 458 P. 2d 877, at 879.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with another attorney, was considered "reasonable" under the
Utah Implied Consent Statute.
In Hunter v. Dorius, supra, one hour and eighteen
minutes passed from the time of the initial stop by the police
until the accused was advised of the consequences of further
refusal to submit to a chemical test, with one hour and thirtyfive minutes total time elapsing.

In the instant case, one

hour and forty-five minutes passed from the initial stop of
Respondent to her being advised of the consequences of any
continued delay in submitting to the test, with two hours total
time involved.

The time in both instances are relatively close.

But, a distinguishing fact is that in Hunter v. Dorius a call
was completed to an attorney who advised the accused not to
take the test and this refusal was told to the officer.

The

officer apparently did not viev; the refusal as final and allowed
the accused to continue to try and reach his own attorney.
While not expressily stated in the opinion, the Court seems
to adopt an estoppel theory whereby the officer was precluded .
from denying the accused's right to contact his own attorney
before submitting to the test where the officer agreed to such
an arrangement.

At least, the officer was estopped until he

started the "all-or-nothing" proposition at 9:48 p.m.
Applying a similar theory to the case at bar, Appellant
should be estopped from denying the reasonableness of Respondent's delay in submitting to a test.

Instead of agreeing to

the accused delaying until contact with the personal attorney
occurred, as in Hunter v. Dorius, supra, Officer Hendry agreed
that Respondent could postpone taking the chemical test until
her attorney arrived at the jail.

As noted in the introductory

paragraphs, Respondent does not argue that an absolute right
to the physical presence of counsel prior to the administration
of a chemical test necessarily exists.

But, Respondent would

argue that
Appellant, by not protesting the delay and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at 4:15 p.m. that Officer Hendry told Respondent that he would
no longer allow a delay.

Thus, at 4:15 p.m., with the

explanation of the consequence of continued refusal, the "reasonable period/' referred to in Hunter v. Dorius as starting
at 9:48 p.m., began to run.
fact must be considered.

Even at 4:15 p.m., an additional

Officer Hendry was informed at that

time that Mr. Maughan, the attorney involved, had already left
his home and would arrive shortly.

Knowing this, the officer

waited a few minutes and then left the station without informing
anyone of his whereabouts.

Considering all the circumstances,

Respondent acted reasonably by relying on the officer f s
assertions and delaying submission.

After the full warning

given at 4:15 p.m., Respondent, under the ruling of Hunter v.
Dorius, still had a reasonable time to decide to submit to
the test.
POINT II
When a statement of the Miranda Warning
and rights is coupled with an explanation of
an Implied Consent Statute, and confusion
results in the mind of the accused as to the
extent of the right to counsel, the accused
should not be held strictly accountable for
any delay in submitting to a chemical test
arising out of this confusion.
Even in jurisdictions which do not recognize any
right to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical
test under an Implied Consent Statute, a defense does arise
where a statement of the right to counsel under Miranda is
coupled with an explanation of the Implied Consent Law.

If

this occurs and the accused is thereby confused and believes
that he has a right to have an attorney present before submitting
to any chemical tests, courts have held that the accused's
delay must be deemed reasonable under the circumstances.

But

if the officer specifically informs the accused that the rights
under Miranda do not apply to the taking of chemical tests
under the Implied Consent Law, then the defense will not apply
from that point in time forward.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In two cases cited by Appellant, the above referred
to defense was expressly recognized.
In Kauffman v. Motor Vehicles Division, Department
of Transportation, Ore. App, 500 P. 2d 473 (1972), while the
court found that the accused by refusing, under advise of
counsel, to blow into a breathanalyzer a second time constituted
a refusal under the Implied Consent Statute, the court initially
discussed the reasonableness of the accused delaying the test
until his attorney was physically present at the jail.

Since

the officer confused the accused by allowing the latter to
believe that he could wait for his attorney to arrive, the Oregon
Court concluded that the accused could not be held accountable
for such delay.

Subsequently, the Oregon Court re-affirmed

its position in Kauffman in Cavagnaro v. Motor Vehicles Division,
Department of Transportation, Ore. App, 528 P. 2d 1090 (1974).
* n Cavagnaro, after some delay occassioned by the accused
believing that he could delay taking the chemical test until
he had consulted with his attorney, the accused walked away
from the officer while the former's rights were being read to
him.

Despite Oregon Lav; which does not recognize any right

to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test,
the Oregon Court still followed Kauffman and stated that the
accused could not be held accountable for delays caused by
confusion of his rights where such confusion was created by
the officer.

However, under the facts in Cavagnaro, the court

held that the accused was not confused as to his rights so
Kauffman was inapplicable.
Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court has followed
Kauffman, supra.

The accused in Calvert v. State, Department

of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Divisic.i, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo. 1974) ,
was arrested for Driving Under the Influence and advised of
his Miranda rights.

When he asked to call an attorney, he was

refused and then advised of the Implied Consent Law and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

consequences of refusal
but not
that
his Miranda rights
Machine-generated
OCR,told
may contain
errors.

10

were inapplicable in this context.

The court noted that in

Colorado no right to consult with counsel in regards to chemical
tests for alcohol content is recognized.

Additionally, the

refusal to submit to a test until an attorney is consulted or
has arrived would constitute a refusal as contemplated under
the Colorado Statute.

Nevertheless, citing Kauffman, supra,

the Colorado Supreme Court concluded,
Where, as here, law enforcement officers,
even though inadvertently, either through an
act of omission or commission, cause a
suspect's misunderstanding of the state of
the law, he cannot be held strictly accountable
for his refusal to take implied consent tests
519 P. 2d 341, at 343.
The court reversed the revocation of petitionees
license.
Similarily, in California, a jurisdiction which also
does not recognize any right to counsel under the Implied
Consent Statute, the courts have consistently held that confusion from reciting Miranda with the Implied Consent Law can
constitute a defense to any alleged refusal on the part of
the suspect.

In Rees v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 8 Cal.

App. 3d 746, 87 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1970), the court found that
Miranda and the. Implied Consent Law had been given together,
generating confusion, even though tne accused could not recall
being advised of a right to counsel.

The court hold that the

refusal of the accused to take a chemical test which resulted
from the accused not being told that his right to counsel was
not applicable under the circumstances, was not the type of
refusal contemplated by the statute to justify revocation of
the accused's license.

Rees follows a line of California

cases recognizing the defense or exception:

Weber v. Qrr,

274, Cal. App, 21 288, 79 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1969); Wethern v. Qrr,
271 Cal. App, 2d 813, 76 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1969); Rust v._
Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver's Licenses,
267 Cal App, 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1968).
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Minn., 192 NW 2d 441 (1971), the court stated that the Miranda
rights were not required under the Implied Consent Law since
revocation of a license is a civil proceeding.

But, where

Miranda is given and no clarification is made of its inapplicability to taking the chemical tests, a refusal to take the
test based on this confusion does not justify revocation of
the accused's license.

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held

that there is no right to counsel under the Implied Consent
Statute; but, again, where confusion as to this right results
from the giving of Miranda, the accused cannot be deemed to
have refused the test by delaying submission until his attorney
arrives.

Wiseman v. Sullivan j.90 Neb. 724, 211 NW 2d 906 (1973).
While Utah recognizes a right to consult with counsel

prior to submitting to a chemical test for alcohol content,
this court has not specifically addressed the question of the
extent to which confusion arising from the giving of Miranda
with the Implied Consent Law will justify an accused delaying
the submission to the test until his attorney is physically
present.

The issue was recently raised in McCall v. Dorius,

527 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1974), but this court concluded that under
the facts no actual confusion arose but the accused was merely
being uncooperative, pretending not to understand.
Very different facts from McCall v. Dorius, supra,
are presented in the case at bar.

Here, Officer Hendry

initially informed Respondent of her Miranda right to counsel
while reading her the Implied Consent Law (T. 6). The two
statements were actually together on the same printed form (Findings
of Fact 6), and contained no statement that the right to have
an attorney present did not. apply to the taking of chemical
tests.

At no time did Officer Hendry or any other officer

explain to Respondent that Miranda was not necessarily applicable
under the circumstances.

Rather, Officer Hendry reinforced
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officer inform Mr- Maughan, the attorney, that it was unacceptable
to delay the tests until the latter1s arrival.

Finally, at

4:15 when the officer informed Respondent of the consequences
of any further delay in submitting to the test, he still had
not informed her that she did not have a right to the presence
of her attorney as stated under Miranda.

Rather, Respondent

was placed in the dilemna of taking the test, even though
informed in the second phone call to Mr. Maughanfs home that
her attorney was to arrive within minutes; or, of preserving
what she believed to be her constitutional rights as stated by
the officer himself, and refusing the test until her lawyer
arrived.
By the officer's omission of any statement of clarification of Respondent's rights under Miranda and the Implied
Consent Statute, and by the Officer's acquiescence in delaying
the tests until the attorney arrived, Respondent was confused
as to her rights. According to the officer's testimony,
Respondent remained cooperative throughout the entire incident,
never refusing the test but merely delaying it until her
attorney arrived.

This type of good faith confused effort on

the part of Respondent to do whatever was legally required
while still perserving her constitutional rights as stated by
the officer should be viewed as a reasonable refusal, and not
the type of refusal which would justify the revocation of her
license.
CONCLUSION
Under Hunter v. Dorius, Supra, an accused charged
with Driving Under the Influence has a right to consult with
counsel prior to submitting to any chemical tests under the
Implied Consent Statute, Section 41-6-44.10, supra.

No right

to the physical presence of the attorney is argued under the
facts of this case.

But, under either the estoppel theory or

by confusion
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Implied Consent Law, Respondent's delay in submitting to
any test until her attorney arrived at the jail should be
deemed reasonable under the Statute.

The trial court's order

rescinding the revocation of Respondent's license should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

D. GILBERT ATIIAY
Attorney for Respondent
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